IT@Intel Blog

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Intel developed a defense-in-depth strategy to optimize information security using interlocking prediction, prevention, detection and response capabilities. It is a structure designed to support consistent and comprehensive security controls throughout the organization while allowing flexibility needed to manage risk.

It promotes continual improvement, maturity of security services, and adaptability to evolving threats. At Intel, proliferation of the defense in depth methodology has resulted in more efficient business decisions. The fundamental aspects allows for consolidation of support resources, helps highlight alternative methods for managing risk, aligns programs across environments, and keeps focus on achieving optimal security.

Download the whitepaper: Defense In Depth Strategy Optimizes Security

Defense in Depth Information Security Strategy

The Problem of Measuring Information Security

Getting a Return on IT Security Investment

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The third and last part of the video series discussing how you can make use of the vPro system defense capabilities the easy way is out, this video shows an example of how your existing security server can implement network quarantine using system defense on provisioned devices without having to know a thing about AMT.
The video follows on the second video which showed an example of using system defense through the Microsoft SCOM GUI and shows a proof of concept implementation that only requires the security server to input an event into the local windows event log which is easily doable with almost any programming/script language. Behind the scene the SCOM agent installed on the security server intercepts this event, sends notification to the SCOM server and as a result the SCOM server implements the blocking policy on the offending host.



The beauty of this is that now you can choose any server to collect and correlate your security events and take quarantine decisions and all that without this server having to be an AMT management server. the existing AMT manager (SCOM in this example) is doing the hard work for you.
as before I hope you find this useful, I would love to hear comments and answer any questions.
Cheers
Omer.

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Everyone wants information security to be easy. Wouldn't it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie? Well, although I don't try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense' in the context of security. It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

Here is my Fortune Cookie advice for September:

In information security, like in sports, knowing your adversary is far more important than knowing the condition of the field.

Information security is an adversarial pursuit. It all begins with threat agents, those people who will negatively affect your organization. Some are malicious, others are not. The key is they are living, breathing opponents whose motivations drive actions which cause loss. They learn, adapt, and change as they seek their objectives.

Know your threats. This is an important first step. Knowing all your vulnerabilities is fine, but secondary in importance.

For those who are malicious, understand what they target and the likely methods they will employ. Only then can the vulnerabilities be narrowed to show the most probable exposures. This prediction gives the security professional a focus on what to protect, how best to monitor, and preparations necessary to respond when needed.


So am I contributing to the problem of over simplifying security? Or am I reaching out to those who might not take an inordinate amount of time necessary to understand the complexities and nuances of our industry? You decide and feel free to share your knowledge-nuggets.

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Deconstructing Cyber Security Attacks - Threat Model

Defense in Depth Information Security Strategy

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I'm Omer Ben-Shalom and I am a principal engineer with Intel information technology (IT) focusing on mobility and client platforms. I have had the pleasure of working with the Intel development teams on the vPro AMT system defense and decided to share my experiences via a three part video series showing how system defense can help in active response to infected PCs.
There are many threats to the environment. the 'classical' threats originate from the outside and it is the job of the perimeter defenses such as firewalls, IPS and others to block them but the more problematic ones are those that originate from inside the perimeter, these type of attacks are mostly conducted from legitimate machines owned by the business and are quite often carried inside the perimeter unknowingly by employees especially when using mobile platforms such as notebooks which are carried outside the business and back in.
Detecting infected PCs and other malicious activity is done with the help of the various intrusion detections systems and the alerts generated can be collected and aggregated to provide a very good picture of the existing threats. A much more difficult task is the ability to quarantine the hosts carrying out the malicious activity and perform remediation. there are solutions involving both host software and network side blocking but with the host possibly compromised and the network location of the offending host subject to change with mobile platforms effective quarantine and remediation is very complex.
This is where the Intel vPro system defense capabilities come into play by allowing selective network access restrictions on a host, these restrictions can allow only the connectivity necessary to fix the problem and being implemented on the host platform itself cannot be escaped just by changing the network location.
This week we are publishing the first of a three part video series on how to use system defense for this purpose both manually and via integration to existing AMT management. I hope you will all take the time to view the introduction video below. any comments are welcome. I would love to hear your views about the problem as well as the solution.





I hope you enjoyed this video, parts two and three should post by next week, stay tuned

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Everyone wants information security to be easy. Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie? Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security. It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

Here is my Fortune Cookie advice for August:

Security policy is like a seatbelt. It will not protect you every time, but it is guaranteed to fail if you choose not to use it.

No security policy is perfect. In fact, it should be a continuously evolving body of work which is improved as the industry changes and learns. The biggest challenge is not the exactness of the policies; rather it is the awareness and consistent adoption by the employees. An appropriate level of effort must be directed at the successful marketing and support by the target audience.

It may not be sexy, but policy can empower the Management support and maintenance of policy are key factors in leveraging this tool. Clear and straightforward verbiage coupled with sufficient marketing saturation can deliver necessary awareness to affect behaviors. With employee support of security principles, an organization takes a great step forward in achieving an optimal security posture.

So am I contributing to the problem of over simplifying security? Or am I reaching out to those who might not take an inordinate amount of time necessary to understand the complexities and nuances of our industry? You decide and feel free to share your knowledge-nuggets.

A Company’s Greatest Security Threat and Asset

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

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Recently, security expert Bruce Schneier expounded security ROI figures were meaningless! Is it true? Well, yes and no.

The brutal truth.
Well respected information security expert Bruce Schneier recently provided a stark opinion regarding the value of ROI's.
Follow this link to see the story:
http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/security/0,39044215,62037905,00.htm


In brief, Bruce stated security because numbers can be manipulated to justify anything.

He explained that the amount spent on a product can change significantly by simply playing with the equation.
"If the chance of you being attacked is one in a million and I change it to one in two million... I have halved the amount of money you should spend.
"I can make an ROI model say whatever I want. I could justify or not justify anything based on these very, very rare and very, very damaging events," he said.

Tell me it is not true!
I believe Bruce is both right and is delivering a message which is a little incomplete. His general message is accurate and shocking enough to garner the right level of attention. Most of the information security ROI's I have read were speculative, could not be validated, were impossible to reproduce, and had great latitude to provide results which benefit the desires of the author. Nowadays audiences are being provided ‘information' under the auspices of ‘fact', when in reality they are more of an opinion. Such valuation assessments are based on qualitative data versus quantitative metrics.

I blogged about the The Problem of Measuring Information Security back in August 2007

Awareness must be raised. I applaud Bruce in helping to make this happen. His message, as brutal as it sounds, is bringing to light a shadowy area in our industry. I think the follow-up message for audiences is to scrutinize and apply common sense to any ROI they come across. Understand the methodology and if it makes sense in their context. Lifting the curtain can quickly reveal a puppet master pulling the strings to artificially show value.

Like Bruce, I too have a jaded perspective. I have seen some WILD ROI's. Much of what I have read from security vendors is pure folly. However, just because most are fiction, it does not mean all methodologies are without merit.

Intel published a Whitepaper - Measuring the Return on IT Security Investments which is applicable to some situations. This method, far from being a silver-bullet, is a good start and has proven its truthfulness.

For any method, the accuracy should be scrutinized. Can it be validated, repeated? Was the method exclusively developed solely for self serving purposes from someone trying to sell something shiny? Does it make sense? These are the questions I ask myself.

On the bright side, many bright sharp people are working very hard to make the industry better and develop more rigid processes to insure both accuracy and confidence.

In the end, there is much work to be done in the information security valuation space. In the meanwhile, savvy consumers should be aware of the challenges and dive deeper into prospective ROI's and determine if they are ‘meaningless'.

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Can an organizations greatest security asset also be its most serious threat? Yes it can.


The Greatest Asset
I manage information security for Intel’s mergers and acquisitions. Recently, I was evaluating an acquired company and delivering information security training to our newest employees on their collective hire date. As I was presenting the fundamentals of how to keep the company, their work, and our industry safe from cyber threats, an important security maxim was exemplified.

In interacting with the audience, I understood how they were accustomed to conduct business, the scope of information they handle on a daily basis, and their views on the value of security. I began to emphasize how the employee base was the greatest asset to information security and the combined force of a well informed, properly trained, and security savvy workforce dwarfs the efforts of the dedicated security staff. My recruitment speech sunk in and their faces glowed with pride. I saw a bit of excitement from the audience, that of empowerment and newfound responsibility. I was setting them up. Although absolutely true, a few slides later in my presentation I unveiled the stark reality.


The Greatest Threat
I asked to my newly recruited security champions what the greatest threat to the company was. Amid different answers, I revealed that THEY were the greatest threat. Not just them, but the entire workforce. The glow in their faces dimmed a bit. How can this be? How can our employees be both the greatest asset and the worst enemy in the cyber warfare trenches? They were shocked. They were dumbfounded. They were intrigued. I gave a dramatic pause. It is not often people are captivated by the boring and bothersome topic of information security. I savored the moment.

The real battlefield is in hearts and minds of employees. These new employees, more than any, represent the greatest challenge. They are accustomed to their previous ways, inundated with new-hire information, and are not familiar with the security expectations of their new corporate parent. Security policy is a distant concern on their first day. Every subsequent day, the separated cluster of workers will not benefit from the social reinforcement of good security practices as they are distanced from the collective body of experienced employees who exhibit secure behaviors.

We discussed how apathy, laziness, and circumventing policy for a quick gain, can cause significant weaknesses in security. Every employee has a responsibility to be secure and reinforce those fundamentals with their peers. A single employee through malice or carelessness can cause more damage than a legion of hackers. They must decide, through their actions, if they are the security marshals or the villains of the story. The battle is with the mindset of the employees. The finest security policy is worthless in the hands of an apathetic workforce.

In the end, the discussion was a success. It was not just training; it was an interactive dialogue talking to what is important and how every employee, now including them, work as a team to be Intel’s greatest security asset.


So, who do you market to?

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I was recently asked to pull together a quick list of key information security learning's for Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A). This year I assumed responsibility for information security of Intel's M&A programs. M&A work is typically frantic, unpredictable, and ambiguous, involving the brightest engineering and integration management talent. It demands great flexibility and willingness to rapidly adapt creatively to emerging problems. This work is basically a recipe dreaded by us entrenched security types, who like the controllability of consistent, predicable, and structured activities. It can press the boundaries of good security practices and test the mettle of the strongest security organizations.


Top 5 Key Learning's for M&A Information Security

    1. Security does not happen by default. As the complexities of divestitures emerge, smart people aggressively move to solve problems and security is likely not a consideration. Information Security must be involved both at the early planning stages and stay engaged until the last tactical maneuver is completed
    2. Profiling the data is key. Knowing what data is involved, it's sensitivity, who has logical/physical access, and where it is physically located is necessary. It will be needed to insure regulatory, legal, and IP confidentiality protection
    3. Technical and Behavioral considerations must be incorporated to prevail. Neither must be ignored, and in most cases the combination must be applied to every issue where information security is at risk. A security savvy M&A team is the first step to highly effective results
    4. Logical and physical security aspects cannot be separated. Information security professionals can easily overlook the physical security factors which can jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the business just as logical based threats
    5. Great attention must be paid to data retention, transfer, and destruction. ‘Deal data' can be a vague and changingconcept which may be interpreted differently over time, especially in larger deals. Understanding the scope, expectations, and commitments is a necessity

After reviewing the list, I had an interesting observation. It occurred to me there was a glaring omission. The unwavering support of information security by management is absolutely crucial. To be honest, I left it out as I am spoiled. The Intel culture and chain of management is very supportive of information security. So for those of you less fortunate, add it to the list.

Feeling a little M&A&D...or, blogging on IT aspects of Intel's mergers, acquisitions and divestitures programs

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Everyone wants information security to be easy. Wouldn't it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie? Well, although I don't try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.


Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense' in the context of security. It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.


Here is my Fortune Cookie advice for June:

A perfect security program does not make your environment invincible! It would be astronomically too expensive. The 'perfect' security program achieves the optimal balance of spending, loss prevented, and acceptable losses (residual loss).


Now if I can just figure out how to stuff these little cookies...

Am I contributing to the problem of over simplifying security? Or am I reaching out to those who might not take an inordinate amount of time necessary to understand the complexities and nuances of our industry? You decide and feel free to share your knowledge-nuggets.

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

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Measuring the value of information security programs is difficult and a problem for the entire industry. Come join us for a 3 part series discussing the challenges, how Intel is taking a practical approach, and where the future may take information security metrics.

Last week, Matthew Rosenquist & I discussed an actual Intel case study with Enrique Herrera. In this last of the three part series, we will discuss some practical approaches to determine the value of information security initiatives, including some future-looking ideas, and how security metrics might be implemented on a national scale.

The show is 30 minutes, starting tomorrow (June 4) at 10:30 PDT. To listen in, go to the OpenPort home page, and a little ways down on the left side you'll find the BlogTalk Radio link. Take that link and follow the instructions. You don't need an account to listen or participate in the discussion. If you can't make it live, you can also find the recorded sessions there too, after the show.

See you there!

Return On Security Investment - BlogTalk Radio
Wednesday, June 4, 2008
10:30 AM PDT / 1:30 EDT
http://communities.intel.com/index.jspa

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Measuring the value of information security programs is difficult and a problem for the entire industry. In the second of the three part series, Intel discusses a practical approach to determine value of information security initiatives. Intel security professionals Tim Casey, Enrique Herrera, and Matthew Rosenquist discussed the success of Intel’s security value methodology outlined in the Whitepaper - Measuring the Return on IT Security Investments


Listen to how Intel utilizes this strategy as one means to measure the value of security programs. The whitepaper is available for download.

The 30 minute discussion can be replayed here:


The last of the three part series, Future State of Security Measurement, will occur on Wednsday June 4th. Everyone is welcome to participate or just listen in. Details can be found here:
http://communities.intel.com/openport/blogs/it/2008/05/12/how-do-you-measure-something-that-doesnt-happen

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Everyone wants information security to be easy. Wouldn't it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie? Well, although I don't try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.


Common Sense.
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense' in the context of security. It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.


Here is my Fortune Cookie advice for May:

Two types of victims exist...
Those with something of value, and those who are easy targets.
Therefore: Don't be an easy target, and protect your valuables.


Now if I can just figure out how to stuff these little cookies...


So am I contributing to the problem of over simplifying security? Or am I reaching out to those who might not take an inordinate amount of time necessary to understand the complexities and nuances of our industry? You decide and feel free to share your knowledge-nuggets.

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Good security conversations benefit all involved. The more we share, discuss, and challenge each other, the more we advance our industry. Thankfully, I have the benefit of working closely with a brigade of information security professionals and we banter at every opportunity, for the sheer pleasure and insights. In that same spirit, we hosted our first Blog-Talk radio session. This was a general discussion of the problems of measuring security.


http://communities.intel.com/openport/servlet/JiveServlet/downloadImage/1430/Blog+Talk+Radio+picture+Tim+and+Matt+May+2008a.jpg

The 30 minute discussion can be replayed here
Two other internet chats are planned. Everyone is welcome to participate or just listen in. Details can be found here.

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Come join us!

The success of a security program is measured by an event that doesn't happen, so how do you know if you were successful? Matt Rosenquist, Intel’s Information Security Strategist will do a three-part series on Blog Talk Radio discussing the difficulties of measuring a security program.

Segment 1: May 20th at 10:30 AM (Pacific): The Problem of Measuring Security Part 1 of 3

Segment 2: May 29th at 10:30 AM (Pacific): Return on Security Investment - Intel Cast Study Part 2 of 3

Segment 3: June 4th at 10:30 AM (Pacific): Future State of Security Measurement Part 3 of 3


Our Blog Talk Radio segments are interactive and we will be taking live calls from listeners (Call-in Number: (347) 326-9831) and live chat over the Web.


What are your questions for Matt around security metrics?

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In the summer of 2002 I received a phone call from one of Intel’s senior information security experts, Brian Willis. Brian had just returned from an event in Washington D.C. that he was very excited about. Gartner and the U.S. Naval War College had hosted a three-day seminar-style war game called “Digital Pearl Harbor.” The purpose of the war game was to involve industry for the first time in investigating the possibilities for catastrophic attack of and through the U.S. internet system. They had invited a number of private corporations to participate in this new methodology, and Brian attended as Intel’s representative.

At the time I was working on some risk modeling techniques, so Brian figured I’d be interested in what he had learned. He called and started with, “We have to do this!” He described the event and the possibilities he saw for Intel. The event was very successful and provided much valuable information to the sponsors as defenders, but Brian saw a different aspect. As an “attacker” in the game, he saw how easily and dynamically the attackers in cyberspace were able to build their own systems, business as well as technological, and emphasize their own priorities. The visibility that the game gave into this process came as a bit of a surprise to him and other participants, and Brian recognized how valuable this perspective was to understanding risks facing any defender.

So we decided to stage something similar at Intel, but focusing on the attacker viewpoint rather than the defenders. Although this is somewhat different than a classical war game, we kept the basic process (and the name “war game”) to keep it different from other risk assessment methods. It wasn’t easy to come up with our own game. At the time, there was very little about war gaming that wasn’t based on military objectives, and it was almost all from the defender’s point of view. I even called the U.S. Naval War College; they were very interested and supportive but had little they could share. But through the collective effort of many people, by the summer of 2003 we had put together our own Intel Digital Wargame. The game event itself lasted for two days, and involved nearly every Intel business unit organized in six cells spread across three U.S. cities. It was wildly successful, beyond our expectations, and all the participants said it was exhausting but also both the most instructive and the most fun event they had attended in a long time.

Since then, we have conducted a number of smaller games and continue to have good success with the process. Along the way we have refined it, although we consider it still very much a work in progress. The paper published here is a detailed description of our current process. If war gaming sounds interesting to you, or you are already doing something similar, I hope this will be of use to you. In any case, I would like to hear of your thoughts or experiences or best practices in this area, as we are always looking to learn and improve.

Wargames: Serious Play that Tests Enterprise Security Assumptions

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