IT@Intel Blog

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Everyone wants information security to be easy. Wouldn't it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie? Well, although I don't try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense' in the context of security. It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

Here is my Fortune Cookie advice for September:

In information security, like in sports, knowing your adversary is far more important than knowing the condition of the field.

Information security is an adversarial pursuit. It all begins with threat agents, those people who will negatively affect your organization. Some are malicious, others are not. The key is they are living, breathing opponents whose motivations drive actions which cause loss. They learn, adapt, and change as they seek their objectives.

Know your threats. This is an important first step. Knowing all your vulnerabilities is fine, but secondary in importance.

For those who are malicious, understand what they target and the likely methods they will employ. Only then can the vulnerabilities be narrowed to show the most probable exposures. This prediction gives the security professional a focus on what to protect, how best to monitor, and preparations necessary to respond when needed.


So am I contributing to the problem of over simplifying security? Or am I reaching out to those who might not take an inordinate amount of time necessary to understand the complexities and nuances of our industry? You decide and feel free to share your knowledge-nuggets.

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Deconstructing Cyber Security Attacks - Threat Model

Defense in Depth Information Security Strategy

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Everyone wants information security to be easy. Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie? Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security. It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

Here is my Fortune Cookie advice for August:

Security policy is like a seatbelt. It will not protect you every time, but it is guaranteed to fail if you choose not to use it.

No security policy is perfect. In fact, it should be a continuously evolving body of work which is improved as the industry changes and learns. The biggest challenge is not the exactness of the policies; rather it is the awareness and consistent adoption by the employees. An appropriate level of effort must be directed at the successful marketing and support by the target audience.

It may not be sexy, but policy can empower the Management support and maintenance of policy are key factors in leveraging this tool. Clear and straightforward verbiage coupled with sufficient marketing saturation can deliver necessary awareness to affect behaviors. With employee support of security principles, an organization takes a great step forward in achieving an optimal security posture.

So am I contributing to the problem of over simplifying security? Or am I reaching out to those who might not take an inordinate amount of time necessary to understand the complexities and nuances of our industry? You decide and feel free to share your knowledge-nuggets.

A Company’s Greatest Security Threat and Asset

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

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Recently, security expert Bruce Schneier expounded security ROI figures were meaningless! Is it true? Well, yes and no.

The brutal truth.
Well respected information security expert Bruce Schneier recently provided a stark opinion regarding the value of ROI's.
Follow this link to see the story:
http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/security/0,39044215,62037905,00.htm


In brief, Bruce stated security because numbers can be manipulated to justify anything.

He explained that the amount spent on a product can change significantly by simply playing with the equation.
"If the chance of you being attacked is one in a million and I change it to one in two million... I have halved the amount of money you should spend.
"I can make an ROI model say whatever I want. I could justify or not justify anything based on these very, very rare and very, very damaging events," he said.

Tell me it is not true!
I believe Bruce is both right and is delivering a message which is a little incomplete. His general message is accurate and shocking enough to garner the right level of attention. Most of the information security ROI's I have read were speculative, could not be validated, were impossible to reproduce, and had great latitude to provide results which benefit the desires of the author. Nowadays audiences are being provided ‘information' under the auspices of ‘fact', when in reality they are more of an opinion. Such valuation assessments are based on qualitative data versus quantitative metrics.

I blogged about the The Problem of Measuring Information Security back in August 2007

Awareness must be raised. I applaud Bruce in helping to make this happen. His message, as brutal as it sounds, is bringing to light a shadowy area in our industry. I think the follow-up message for audiences is to scrutinize and apply common sense to any ROI they come across. Understand the methodology and if it makes sense in their context. Lifting the curtain can quickly reveal a puppet master pulling the strings to artificially show value.

Like Bruce, I too have a jaded perspective. I have seen some WILD ROI's. Much of what I have read from security vendors is pure folly. However, just because most are fiction, it does not mean all methodologies are without merit.

Intel published a Whitepaper - Measuring the Return on IT Security Investments which is applicable to some situations. This method, far from being a silver-bullet, is a good start and has proven its truthfulness.

For any method, the accuracy should be scrutinized. Can it be validated, repeated? Was the method exclusively developed solely for self serving purposes from someone trying to sell something shiny? Does it make sense? These are the questions I ask myself.

On the bright side, many bright sharp people are working very hard to make the industry better and develop more rigid processes to insure both accuracy and confidence.

In the end, there is much work to be done in the information security valuation space. In the meanwhile, savvy consumers should be aware of the challenges and dive deeper into prospective ROI's and determine if they are ‘meaningless'.

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Everyone wants information security to be easy. Wouldn't it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie? Well, although I don't try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.


Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense' in the context of security. It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.


Here is my Fortune Cookie advice for June:

A perfect security program does not make your environment invincible! It would be astronomically too expensive. The 'perfect' security program achieves the optimal balance of spending, loss prevented, and acceptable losses (residual loss).


Now if I can just figure out how to stuff these little cookies...

Am I contributing to the problem of over simplifying security? Or am I reaching out to those who might not take an inordinate amount of time necessary to understand the complexities and nuances of our industry? You decide and feel free to share your knowledge-nuggets.

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

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Measuring the value of information security programs is difficult and a problem for the entire industry. Come join us for a 3 part series discussing the challenges, how Intel is taking a practical approach, and where the future may take information security metrics.

Last week, Matthew Rosenquist & I discussed an actual Intel case study with Enrique Herrera. In this last of the three part series, we will discuss some practical approaches to determine the value of information security initiatives, including some future-looking ideas, and how security metrics might be implemented on a national scale.

The show is 30 minutes, starting tomorrow (June 4) at 10:30 PDT. To listen in, go to the OpenPort home page, and a little ways down on the left side you'll find the BlogTalk Radio link. Take that link and follow the instructions. You don't need an account to listen or participate in the discussion. If you can't make it live, you can also find the recorded sessions there too, after the show.

See you there!

Return On Security Investment - BlogTalk Radio
Wednesday, June 4, 2008
10:30 AM PDT / 1:30 EDT
http://communities.intel.com/index.jspa

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Measuring the value of information security programs is difficult and a problem for the entire industry. In the second of the three part series, Intel discusses a practical approach to determine value of information security initiatives. Intel security professionals Tim Casey, Enrique Herrera, and Matthew Rosenquist discussed the success of Intel’s security value methodology outlined in the Whitepaper - Measuring the Return on IT Security Investments


Listen to how Intel utilizes this strategy as one means to measure the value of security programs. The whitepaper is available for download.

The 30 minute discussion can be replayed here:


The last of the three part series, Future State of Security Measurement, will occur on Wednsday June 4th. Everyone is welcome to participate or just listen in. Details can be found here:
http://communities.intel.com/openport/blogs/it/2008/05/12/how-do-you-measure-something-that-doesnt-happen

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Measuring the value of information security programs is difficult and a problem for the entire industry. Come join us for a 3 part series discussing the challenges, how Intel is taking a practical approach, and where the future may take information security metrics.

Last week, Matthew Rosenquist & I discussed why measuring ROSI is important, and the very difficult challenges in doing so. In this second of the three part series, we will discuss a practical approach to determine value of information security initiatives. Joining Matt & myself this week from Costa Rica is Enrique Herrera, who will discuss an actual Intel case study.

The show is 30 minutes, starting tomorrow (May 29) at 10:30 PDT. To listen in, go to the OpenPort home page, and a little ways down on the left side you'll find the BlogTalk Radio link. Take that link and follow the instructions. You don't need an account to listen or participate in the discussion. If you can't make it live, you can also find the recorded sessions there too, after the show.

See you there!

Return On Security Investment - BlogTalk Radio
Thursday, May 29, 2008
10:30 AM PDT / 1:30 EDT
http://communities.intel.com/index.jspa

0 Comments Permalink
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Everyone wants information security to be easy. Wouldn't it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie? Well, although I don't try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.


Common Sense.
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense' in the context of security. It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.


Here is my Fortune Cookie advice for May:

Two types of victims exist...
Those with something of value, and those who are easy targets.
Therefore: Don't be an easy target, and protect your valuables.


Now if I can just figure out how to stuff these little cookies...


So am I contributing to the problem of over simplifying security? Or am I reaching out to those who might not take an inordinate amount of time necessary to understand the complexities and nuances of our industry? You decide and feel free to share your knowledge-nuggets.

1 Comments Permalink
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Good security conversations benefit all involved. The more we share, discuss, and challenge each other, the more we advance our industry. Thankfully, I have the benefit of working closely with a brigade of information security professionals and we banter at every opportunity, for the sheer pleasure and insights. In that same spirit, we hosted our first Blog-Talk radio session. This was a general discussion of the problems of measuring security.


http://communities.intel.com/openport/servlet/JiveServlet/downloadImage/1430/Blog+Talk+Radio+picture+Tim+and+Matt+May+2008a.jpg

The 30 minute discussion can be replayed here
Two other internet chats are planned. Everyone is welcome to participate or just listen in. Details can be found here.

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Come join us!

The success of a security program is measured by an event that doesn't happen, so how do you know if you were successful? Matt Rosenquist, Intel’s Information Security Strategist will do a three-part series on Blog Talk Radio discussing the difficulties of measuring a security program.

Segment 1: May 20th at 10:30 AM (Pacific): The Problem of Measuring Security Part 1 of 3

Segment 2: May 29th at 10:30 AM (Pacific): Return on Security Investment - Intel Cast Study Part 2 of 3

Segment 3: June 4th at 10:30 AM (Pacific): Future State of Security Measurement Part 3 of 3


Our Blog Talk Radio segments are interactive and we will be taking live calls from listeners (Call-in Number: (347) 326-9831) and live chat over the Web.


What are your questions for Matt around security metrics?

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Intel IT developed a model for measuring Return on Security Investment (ROSI) in our manufacturing environments that produces a much higher level of accuracy than other methods currently available. Our model has enabled us to make business-driven decisions about security programs, resulting in savings in excess of USD 18 million per year in avoided losses.

Whitepaper now Available! Measuring the Return on IT Security Investments

Quantifying value for security programs is difficult at best. Intel successfully developed and employed a method to measure the value of security programs across our worldwide factories. Although not the silver bullet to measure all security programs, it does show in some circumstances, value can be quantified to the level needed to make sound business decisions.

This is one of many different methods which Intel leverages to determine value of security programs. The difference is being able to tie in hard numbers for prevented losses and the ability to predict future impacts with reasonable accuracy. Other available methods rely on more qualitative descriptions of value and lack a dollar and sense measure. Although no single methodology fits all situations, Intel has found a niche for this insightful metric which is an empowering view of security value.

Other related blogs:

Practical Aspects of Measuring Security

Getting a Return on IT Security Investment

Managing the Effort to Measure Security

The Problem of Measuring Information Security

The Four Dirty Questions of Measuring Information Security

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To defeat cyber attacks, we must first understand their characteristics and how they come about. Deconstructing threats is a way of comprehending the factors which drive information security strategy. Without understanding the nature of attacks, an organization is destined to thrash about trying to effect change, only addressing symptoms and oblivious to the root causes of the problems.


In the Beginning
The most important aspect to comprehend is all malicious security threats and attacks begin with a person who has an objective. This represents the attacker, or sometimes referred to as the ‘Threat Agent'. Make no mistake, a virus is not the attacker. The author and implementer of the virus is the attacker. Eliminating a virus is a short term solution to the symptom of the problem, leaving the threat agent to find another method to achieve their objectives.

Threat agents are people and therefore driven by human nature. People compelled to expend energy manifesting in an attack on your organization have some desired outcome, a goal in mind. Their objective may be vague or precise, motivated by passion or logic, it may be inspired by emotional, intellectual, or economic needs. Their actions may target you directly or your organization may simply be caught in their sweeping net of activity. The permutations are mind boggling, especially when you take into account attackers include trusted persons intimately associated with the organization. Most importantly, they are thinking opponents who may plan, react, adapt, weigh options, and make decisions necessary to achieve their objective. Security success is heavily dependant on never losing sight of this key perspective. Attacks and threat agents are irrevocably tied together.


Building a Model
So if you have an attacker and their objective, the only component missing is the means for this person to achieve their goal. This path is the method. In reality, it most likely is a number of methods which are evaluated and one or more eventually employed. The term ‘vulnerability' is a catch-all phrase attached to express these methods. The term itself is far too broad to be meaningful. Anything can be a ‘vulnerability', including a security control itself. If you have a deadbolt on your door and someone kicks it in, an expert may declare the deadbolt is the vulnerability. Somewhat absurd, which is why I personally dislike using the term. So don't expect to see that word much from here forward.

What do methods look like? It depends on the attacker, what opportunities are available to them, and their objectives. If an attacker is seeking personal satisfaction through ego gratification of power, they may decide to employ a Denial of Service attack to show they can affect a target network. An accounts payable employee may secretly use their legitimate access to issue checks to collaborators for their personal financial gain. Again, the possibilities and permutations are as vast and varying as the people involved.


Threat Model
This basic model is straightforward. A threat agent, willing to effort an attack, has an objective in mind and selects one or more methods to succeed. Once committed, they initiate their plans and the game begins. Defenders may put up obstacles, close possible methods and the attacker, if still motivated, will respond.

http://communities.intel.com/openport/servlet/JiveServlet/downloadImage/38-10761-1168/Threat+Model+6.bmp


Defeating the Attack
The game continues until the attacker succeeds, the attacker is removed or demoralized, the methods are rendered ineffective, or the objective is removed. Removing the attacker is a good but very difficult prospect, usually involving some type of law enforcement. More often the attacker is demoralized by making the prospect of achieving their objective very costly, so they either give up or move to an easier target.

Prevention activities are heavily weighted toward closing the most likely methods. A good strategy, which scales across many different attackers, but the simple fact is an attacker only needs one winning method to triumph. Much of the efforts to close different paths to the objective are intended to make it progressively more difficult for attackers to succeed. Not every path or vulnerability (ugg, hate that word) must be eliminated, only the ones which the attackers are willing to effort. The more inconvenient and inhospitable the environment is for the attacker, the better it is for the defending organization.

Lastly, removing the objective from temptation makes an attack pointless. The famous bank robber Will Sutton purportedly replied to the question "why do you rob banks?" with "because that's where the money is". The same no-nonsense principle applies to information security. Take away the objective, and the very reason for the attack is undermined.

Understanding the characteristics of attacks is paramount to good security strategy. It helps clear the fog of effectiveness and provides a perspective on how attacks can be stopped in a coordinated manner.

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Ethics represent the very cornerstone by which any security organization is built. Without them, a security team is doomed. They will not be respected only feared, they will not be supported only ridiculed or ignored. It is a downward spiral of failure for security organizations practicing unethical behaviors. Management and customers will lose faith, leading to a loss of funding, access and representation. Resources, tools, and overall capability will diminish, leading to loss of effectiveness and value, further advancing the loss of faith by management and customers. Concealment, inconsistency, indifference, or treading in the gray areas of ethics is just prolonging the inevitable trip on the downward slide to defeat. So how can it be, many security professionals have a casual attitude and apathetic commitment toward ethics?

I have been reading some disturbing stories about security professionals being unethical and in some cases fired or arrested for their activities. They stories aren't hard to find. Trusted security people breaking into systems and networks, deciding not to report criminal activities, or ignoring inappropriate activities to avoid complications are common examples of poor ethos. People violating policies they are employed to enforce and uphold is downright despicable. In many cases, what are worse are the comments left by readers, condoning inconsistent behaviors on behalf of security. Comments like "pick your battles", "follow your conscience", or you should only be ethical if others are, is very upsetting.


Reader Beware
I am a fanatic about ethics. I firmly believe ethics, following a code of conduct, is the foundation of every professional security organization. Without consistent ethical behavior, a security team is destined for failure, will open the organization to increased liability and sour future investments in security.

Okay, let me be the first to admit, I have it easy. The security professionals I have the pleasure to know and work closely with are of the highest moral caliber. I am fortunate to work in an organization which embraces the principles of ethics. We derive our support from the corporate principles which are ingrained within the company as a whole and are driven out to all corners. My company (I am a shareholder too) spends time to train, discuss, and reinforce ethics with all employees.

I support ethics in all vocations, but some are more important than others. Security personnel must be held to a higher standard, just as judges and law enforcement must be viewed as incorruptible. Ethics must also reign supreme in financial and medical industries as well. Nothing less is acceptable. We too, as security professionals, should be put under the microscope and make firm commitments to consistency and the highest level of behavior. Our organizations place trust and faith that we will be honest, capable, and perform our duty in an unwavering manner.


Intel's Security Operations Center - Code of Conduct
When I spun up Intel's Security Operations Center, every employee was trained on ethics and we developed a Code of Conduct to insure the expectations were clear and as a team we would all conduct ourselves in a conservative manner.

Intel's Security Operations Center - Code of Conduct
1. Provide diligent and competent service to principals

  • Provide timely, professional, and productive response to our customers, peers, vendors, business partners, and management
  • Act honestly, justly, responsibly, and legally
  • Act impartially to all groups, persons, and organizations

2. Protect and conserve Intel property, resources, and reputation
  • Preserve and protect the value of corporate systems, applications, and information
  • Operate fully within the law, observe corporate policy, and align efforts with standard operating procedures
  • Disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate management or oversight bodies

3. Promote and preserve company trust and confidence of the team
  • Take care not to injure the reputation of the team through malice or indifference
  • Be truthful and accurate in representation and all communications
  • Respect the trust, access, authority, and privileges the company grants you
  • Promote, comply, and reinforce company security policies, procedures, and intentions
  • Avoid conflicts of interest or the appearance thereof


Everyone is ethical, right?
Ever ask somebody if they are a good person or ethical? I will bet you will hear some variation of the same answer, "yes. Of course I am!". How many people openly admit or believe they are not ethical? So are you? Yea, exactly what I thought you would say.

So, Mr/Ms Ethical, you wouldn't be averse to answering a few ethics related questions? These are a subset of questions I ask when delivering the ethics class to our Security Operations Center. They should be easy for an ethical security minded professional such as yourself...

  • 1. You are conducting a confidential investigation of Employee ‘A'. An employee outside the team, asks "Are you investigating Employee ‘A'?"
You Answer:
A. Yes, we are
B. No, we are not
C. Maybe
D. I'm not sure/I don't know
E. Other: _____
  • 2. Policy prohibits any team member from installing software on Server ‘A'. In an emergency situation, senior management instructs you to install a critical piece of software on Server ‘A' to benefit the company.
You cite policy and:
A. Install the software
B. Refuse to install the software
C. Document the request and install the software
D. Document the request and refuse to install the software
  • 3. You are aware state law prohibits any team member from removing software on Server ‘A'. In an emergency situation, your management instructs you to delete a critical piece of software on Server ‘A'.
You cite state law and:
A. Delete the software
B. Refuse to delete the software
C. Document the request and delete the software
D. Document the request and refuse to remove the software
  • 4. Your manager instructs you to do something which is contrary to normal operating procedures. What do you do?
You cite the normal operating procedures and:
A. Do what is asked and report the incident to senior management
B. Refuse to do what is asked and report the incident to senior management
C. Document the request and do what is asked
D. Document the request, refuse to do what is asked, and report the incident to senior management

Life is vague. Ethics don't need to be.
We all find ourselves in unique circumstances which are complicated and tricky. Applying a code of conduct illuminates the right ethical path. Allowance of ‘flexible ethics' and ‘gray area' practices are ultimately self destructive and leads to instability and demise. Make a stand.


So what are the answers to the above questions? Well, as we all indicated we are ethical, their really is no need for me to provide the answers. We all know them.

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Want to get serious about Information Security? It is time for a Defense in Depth strategy. Interlocking Prediction, Prevention, Detection, and Response capabilities is the key. As no single solution provides comprehensive security, the way to achieve optimal security bliss is to apply a Defense in Depth approach of complementing capabilities to protect your computing environment and the data within. This strategy is highly effective at providing security assurance, cost efficient, scalable to large organizations, adaptive to changing threats, and proven to work.

The concept is straightforward. Establish a system of capabilities and services which align to attackers, their objectives and the methods they are most likely to attempt. Couple this with an understanding they will succeed sometimes and embed the fact at every turn there exist a learning opportunity to improve the system.

http://communities.intel.com/openport/servlet/JiveServlet/downloadImage/38-10702-1127/Defense+in+Depth.JPG

Prediction:
Security threats are about opposition. These threat agents are living, breathing opponents who are creative, knowledgeable, motivated, and have personal objectives in mind. These agents utilize available methods and resources to achieve whatever goals they seek by leveraging vulnerabilities in people, computing systems, and communication networks. In total, this represents a massive potential target landscape to be protected, edge to edge. Good luck.

The reality is you can't protect against everything and everyone. It is too cost prohibitive and in most cases impossible anyways. Although the truly paranoid may disagree, not everyone is interested in attacking you and within the realm of possible attack methods; it is more than likely only a few would be employed. The "path of least resistance" rule applies here.

A common pitfall is to rely exclusively on vulnerability assessments to determine where to focus. Although vulnerability assessments are valuable, they are misleading if the only source for Prediction. Understanding your opponent is fundamentally different than being aware of the weaknesses inherent to your environment. The result will be expending effort on areas which will never be targeted for exploit. Consequently, fewer resources will be available for areas under siege.

The best security professionals understand the relationship between attacks and the environment they protect. They marshal their resources to intercept the most likely attack vectors for the greatest effect. Prediction is the first step in the efficient use of security resources. Knowing why your organization would be attacked, likely targets, and the ‘easy' ways which tantalize attackers, provides the insights necessary to prevent such incidents.


Prediction:
Security threats are about opposition. These threat agents are living, breathing opponents who are creative, knowledgeable, motivated, and have personal objectives in mind. These agents utilize available methods and resources to achieve whatever goals they seek by leveraging vulnerabilities in people, computing systems, and communication networks. In total, this represents a massive potential target landscape to be protected, edge to edge. Good luck.

The reality is you can't protect against everything and everyone. It is too cost prohibitive and in most cases impossible anyways. Although the truly paranoid may disagree, not everyone is interested in attacking you and within the realm of possible attack methods; it is more than likely only a few would be employed. The "path of least resistance" rule applies here.

A common pitfall is to rely exclusively on vulnerability assessments to determine where to focus. Although vulnerability assessments are valuable, they are misleading if the only source for Prediction. Understanding your opponent is fundamentally different than being aware of the weaknesses inherent to your environment. The result will be expending effort on areas which will never be targeted for exploit. Consequently, fewer resources will be available for areas under siege.

The best security professionals understand the relationship between attacks and the environment they protect. They marshal their resources to intercept the most likely attack vectors for the greatest effect. Prediction is the first step in the efficient use of security resources. Knowing why your organization would be attacked, likely targets, and the ‘easy' ways which tantalize attackers, provides the insights necessary to prevent such incidents.


Prevention:
This is where the magic happens. Preventing or deterring attacks is where everyone wants to be. Given the insights of Prediction, which includes incorporation of industry best-known-methods, you can put forth a front line of defense representing the bulk of your cost efficiency. The purpose is to render ineffective the most likely methods the attackers will employ and deny the attacker's their objectives.

Prevention can take many forms, both technical and behavioral. Here are some examples, but don't take this as a complete list or even a recommendation, as selecting the right prevention solutions is specific to the environment and organization. Policy, security awareness, web proxies, and email filters are examples intersecting people based attacks. Computing systems can be protected with anti-virus, system hardening, compartmentalization, authorization and authentication controls, host firewalls, and timely patching to name a few. Communication network attacks are prevented mostly with high speed automated technical solutions such as firewalls, proxies, as well as secure device configurations and a good network architecture plan.

At its best, a solid prevention plan will eliminate threat agent's easy attacks and protect those critical assets most sought by the attackers. Doing a good job here translates into the biggest bang for the security buck.

"Two types of victims exist: Those with something of value and those who are easy targets. Therefore, don't be an easy target and protect your valuables."
Detection and Monitoring: ( ...when the security drums fail - video)
Unfortunately, at some point a number of attacks will succeed. Although it is most efficient to deter or prevent attacks, ignoring those that do get through the front line defenses is ill advised. Security incidents and intruders must be promptly identified, cornered and squashed like bugs. The first step is the ability to rapidly ascertain when the Prevention defenses have been breached and track the actions of the buggers. Detection and monitoring capabilities sound the alarms and direct the Response resources to the source. Speed and accuracy is most important in detection. However, it must be designed to look in the right areas as it is cost prohibitive to watch everything. Again, Prediction can play a role in deciding what to watch as well as how to monitor.

Response & Recovery:
How an organization responds to successful attacks will have a great determination on what residual losses are finally realized. When an event occurs, having the right processes, people, tools, and capabilities in place to contain the security event is critical. Time is on the side of the attacker. The goal of the security professional is to eradicate the security problem and restore the environment to normal operations. This may range from minor efforts to catastrophic recovery. The earlier the Detection capabilities alert the organization, the easier it is to corral the issues and recover. The savviest attackers are stealthy. They want plenty of time working on achieving their objectives and they dig deep like an infected tick. The longer they have inside, the more damage they can cause and become progressively more difficult to eradicate.

Don't be caught without proper Response and Recovery capabilities. Inability to restore the organization to a safe and normal state, translates to hemorrhaging money, time, resources, productivity, and maybe worse.


Continuous Improvement:
Information security is a continuous process. Key learning's from every event can improve individual areas as well as feed the Prediction services, thus giving a better understanding for the next time around. Defense in Depth can successfully be managed centrally or in a distributive model, as long at the overall strategy remains intact and interactions drive continuous improvements.

http://communities.intel.com/openport/servlet/JiveServlet/downloadImage/38-10702-1128/Defense+in+Depth+process.JPG


If you are ready to take the Defense in Depth plunge, you will be rewarded. Interlocking your strategy in a coherent manner gives better insights to reach and maintain your optimal level of security.

The Problem of Measuring Information Security
Getting a Return on IT Security Investment

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1

Enough fluff, smoke, and flash: get to the point. Why have security?

At the end of the day, it is all about loss. If you don't like experiencing loss then you must do something to avoid, minimize, or control it. Welcome to the world of Security.

Let's first get something out of the way. If you are seeking to eliminate all loss, I admire you enthusiasm, but you are out of your mind. Totally eliminating loss would be wildly expensive and in most cases impossible. How much would it cost to eliminate all auto theft in the world? Much more than is feasible, as just about any solution you propose would have some weakness and require additional measures, which in total would exponentially increase the cost as you near 100% effectiveness. It would become more cost effective to find a better replacement for cars, and destroy them all, rather than prevent all future thefts. Optimal security is not about 100% protection, rather a balance of spending, prevention, and acceptable losses.


The Profile of Loss
Back to reality. Security is about preventing loss and some would argue managing loss or the risk-of-loss. Well, it is splitting hairs, but I would agree with both as they are one in the same. When we talk about loss it encompasses all the tangible costs and impacts as well as the intangibles of missed opportunities, reputation, and goodwill. Only a few types of loss can easily be measured and most cannot easily be mentally grasped, much less quantified.

Security strives to prevent the ‘Loss' of reputation, financial assets, customer goodwill, operations uptime, computing resources, personnel productivity, intellectual property, liability protection, and the list goes on. Some of these are obvious such as a worm which brings your operations to a grinding halt for two days. Others are not as obvious. Losing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of customers would open the liability of lawsuits, potentially incur governmental fines, tarnish the corporate reputation, sour customer goodwill, and invoke long term recovery costs. Failure to meet Sarbanes-Oxley requirements may result in and having to cope with a CFO indictment and the associated difficulties of finding a temporary replacement while your executive spends an extended vacation in a federal penitentiary. A single security incident can inflict many different types of losses which in turn may vary wildly in overall impact.

The Evolving Security Landscape
All security programs exist in an evolving state. The enemies get smarter, move faster, and grow. The technology by which information flows rapidly changes. The very organization being protected and the assets within evolve over time. Regulations, customer expectations, experts' recommendations, and industry best-known-methods morph on a continual basis at a dizzying rate. The effectiveness and efficiency of security varies due to these external drivers as well as internal reasons.

So what does security look like over time? What are the key indicators? Here is my perspective. An organization will experience loss, period. If people are involved and any type of value is inherent, loss is expected. No surprise here. To get a better insight, let's apply the Greed Principle.

Greed Principle
From a security perspective, greed is a double edged sword, both good and bad. Greed drives people to do bad things and break the rules for their benefit, but good as it gives continuing opportunities for security to catch these people. The Greed Principle simply states "Losses will increase if unchecked". This principle manifests itself in many different ways but basically, if someone is successful at finding a way of stealing $10 from you, they will continue unless something intervenes. In fact, they will increase the amount they steal over time. If it worked for $10, why not try $15 and so on. As greed is a strong emotional driver for the bad-guys, it provides more and more opportunities to the good-guys to detect them. Hence ‘greed' being both good and bad.

The greed cycle may be disrupted. Intervention may be in the form of additional controls, prevention, deterrence, social pressure, or direct interdiction just to name a few. Many different mechanisms can influence an attacker. Ultimately, unless something changes, greed guarantees losses will increase over time.

Instituting a decent security program is a surefire way to disrupt the unchecked losses. Even a completely mindless security measure can have a great impact. Ever wonder why sales associates say ‘hello' to you when you enter a boutique shop? Even if they don't have time to help you directly, they will make eye contact, greet you with a smile, and say hello. Is this for better customer service? Well yes that is one side benefit, but the primary function is to reduce the shoplifting. Most small stores don't have the money to maintain a security staff and shoplifting can be a major problem (last I checked, retail prices are ~15% higher to cover the costs of security and residual losses). The simple recognition of someone entering a store has shown to dramatically reduce the chances they will steal. In larger retailers, where they have a security staff, you may not get such a greeting (unless you wander into a predatory commission sales area).

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The Security Maturity Model
Initial landing of a security program will affect the losses from attacks. But there is a price, namely the cost of security. Security spending bubbles before stabilizing in the maturity phase where it becomes more effective by lowering losses and more efficient by optimizing spending. Management usually has a firm hand in the reduction of spending, as they play an important part in keeping tension in the system.

So what do you get for your money? The amount of loss which did not occur, because of the influences of security, is the Loss Prevented. More loss prevented the better. But it is relative as the cost of security plays into the efficiency calculation. Basically the (Loss Prevented) - (Cost of Security) is one measure of value. A negative number is mostly unfavorable, indicating you are spending more on security than you are preventing. I wouldn't recommend that model unless what is being protected is irreplaceable (life safety, unique items, etc.).

Lastly, one other factor must be discussed. Sadly, the organization will still experience loss, regardless of how much you spend on security. This is Residual Loss. Nobody really likes to talk about this ugly fact of life. It is important. This is the gauge by which the organization determines what is acceptable.

Reasonable Expectations
Every security program must continually evolve to align to a changing landscape of attacker, methods, and alterations in the environment being protected. Over the long run, a good security program will get better and cost less.

I have rattled the ‘optimal security' saber before in previous blogs and it continues to hold true: Optimally, an organization should spend the amount of money on security which prevents enough loss to bring the residual losses to an acceptable level. Only management can decide exactly where the sweet-spot exists for any given moment.

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