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For the last 18 months, Intel has invested a significant effort to develop a full strategy & implementation roadmap for social computing within the enterprise.  I am pleased to announce the release of a white paper Developing an Enterprise Social Computing Strategy that I did jointly with Malcolm Harkins, Chief of Information Security. The paper details our approach towards embracing the use of collaborative technologies while addressing the mitigation of legal, HR and governance issues.  Here are some key areas you will find detailed in the paper:

 

  • The business focus for social computing (also refer to: Why Intel is investing in Social Computing
  • Collaborative approach IT, HR and Information Security
  • Intel's integrated architecture
  • Intel's approach to determine early use cases, business value and vendor/solution evaluations
  • Results of a security risk assessment
  • Phased implementation plan
  • Initial results after 3-1/2 months into deployment & adoption

 

There are a lot of key takeaways within this paper.  The biggest one that I hope you will walk away with is:  Enterprise 2.0 is a challenging effort.  Yes, there are risks.  But Intel hasn't discovered any new risks introduced with 2.0 technologies that doesn't already exist with 1.0.  We believe the opportunities outweigh the risks. In fact, we are convinced that inaction carries much greater risks: that the enterprise will not realize the benefits that social computing can deliver, and that employees will increasingly turn to external, unsecured tools for communication.  IT has a leadership opportunity to get ahead of and deliver emerging platforms, at a fraction of the cost of "standard" collaborative infrastructure, to enable their business to stay one step ahead of the competition. 

 

I hope you enjoy the paper.  I welcome your perspectives and learning about that strategy that is yielding success for you.

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In June, I updated you on a small proof of concept studying Energy use in the Office.  The first phase of that PoC is now complete and although detailed results will be included in a paper we’ll be publishing later this year, I thought I’d share a few data points with you now.

 

If you remember from my last post, after establishing a baseline, we split the PoC users in to three groups to test different energy saving techniques.

 

The awareness group, whom we simply provided information on how much energy they were using, what it costs, and as some energy saving tips, reduced their energy usage by an average of 22%.

 

The power management group, whom we used a third-party tool to deploy and enforce client power management settings putting their systems in to standby after an idle period, reduced their energy usage by an average of 10%.

 

The smart strip group, whom we provided USB triggered power strips to power off devices in their office when their laptop was out of their docking station, encounter technical issues resulting in no change to their energy use.

 

While the savings found during the study are compelling, we did run in to several issues both technical and related to the small size of the PoC that could skews the numbers in either direction.  We are now planning to repeat the study on a much lager scale, focusing on awareness and power management profiles, to see if the original findings scale.

 

Please let me know if you have any questions or if you are doing or have done anything similar in your enterprise.

 

-Mike

 

 

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Telescope.jpgRisk metrics are the heart and soul of information security indicators.  An increasing proliferation of tools and assessments has emerged, attempting to quantify states of information security.  Given the nature of what is trying to be measured, this is arguably one of the toughest challenges in the metrics space.  The recent trend is for different bodies to develop and publish their own standards, which creates confusion regarding accuracy and applicability.  Why all the turmoil, competing models, and misalignment?  The sad story is (queue the somber violins) we just have not figured out how to measure information security risks very well.

 

I have seen and applied many different methods, audits, and evaluations with varying degrees of success and disappointment.  I have come to the following three basic conclusions:

  1. Current tools and methods lack maturity in this area, for both accuracy and comprehensiveness (and yes, I am guilty of contributing to the pool)
  2. No silver bullet exists.  A unified method, which provides a predictive overarching and detailed risk analysis, is unlikely.  Different approaches have their applicability.  Choose wisely 
  3. There is no replacement for a security professional’s brain.  From the selection of the analysis method, the gathering of relevant data, to the interpretation of the results, requires a seasoned security professional.  There is no substitute which can handle the ambiguity, chaos, and relational dependencies affecting the outcome


An example will help express some of the challenges.  The OCTAVE methodology, created by Carnegie Mellon University some years ago has been battle tested veteran in this role.  It is a qualitative to quantitative device which leverages the expertise of key people to give a numerical value of risk in their respective area.  Because personal bias and fears, the need to allow flexible ways of answering questions, and the varying degrees of base knowledge between the experts, results can vary greatly without even factoring in the changes occurring in the threat landscape.

 

Let me be clear, I am a fan and a longtime supporter.  However, it has its limitations.  I have developed several assessments based upon the model in a large environment.  As long as the limitations are accepted, it is applied where it leverages its strengths, and the process is rolled out properly, the results can be very valuable.

 

But don’t confuse value with precision.  I have observed the accuracy to be +/- 40% in complex organizations.  I believe this is largely due to multiple tiers of qualitative-to-quantitative analysis and the bias introduced at each level.  Credible sources have expressed a better +/- 20% accuracy for smaller implementations.  Although these numbers sound terrible, it is very good compared to other methods.  I have great respect for the chaps at Carnegie Mellon University who created the methodology.  Groups within our company have used a modified form of this approach, with advanced structures tailored to our computing ecosystem, for years with great success.  The low accuracy rate is not a poor reflection on the CMU model, rather it is a stark insight on how immature we are in this field.

 

So this is a sad story, but one which is not over.  A cadre of very bright people is working to tackle this problem.  In the short term, I expect to see many more methods, theories, templates, and standards emerge for specific situations.  In the end, I doubt if ever we will have a unified way to measure security risks, but I hold high hopes the best will be culled to a small number which can be applied to most situations and deliver reasonable metrics.

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Measuring the Return on Investment (ROI) of information security is challenging but not impossible.  It is important to understand the necessary components and how they interrelate.  In this brief video, I discuss one way of expressing value in relation to the positive impacts of security spending.

 

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Video Length: 3:26 minutes

 

This video provides a high level explanation.  For more information regarding the challenges of information security ROI, please take a look at the following links:

The Problem of Measuring Information Security

How Security Programs Reduce Loss

Whitepaper - Measuring the Return on IT Security Investments

Are Security ROI Figures Meaningless?

BlogTalk Radio Discussion - The Problem of Measuring Security

BlogTalk Radio Discussion - Return on Security Investment – Intel Case Study

The Four Dirty Questions of Measuring Information Security

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Let me begin by way of introduction - I am a strategic financial analyst with Intel IT Finance organization focused on data center strategy and efficiency efforts.  This is my maiden voyage into the world of blogging, so I hope the topic is relevant and interesting to the audience.

Similar to many organizations, Intel IT is focused on constantly improving the cost of keeping the business running while not sacrificing the level of support required by customers.  With industry and technology solutions evolving at an increasing pace, choosing the most appropriate place and time to invest is paramount to driving down infrastructure costs.  Budget constraints in this economic climate and the make implementing efficiency efforts all the more daunting.

In 2008, Intel IT initiated a Design Server Refresh strategy where the basic premise was to leverage server performance improvements to respond to increasing compute requirements without growing data center capacity at a corresponding rate.  In 2008, we were able to remove 20,000 single core servers from our production environment, allowing us to realize approximately $45M savings through avoiding data center additions and server operating costs.  However, even with this strategy driving significant near term results, the 2009 operating environment forced us to pause and re-evaluate the merits of continuing execution to the strategy.

This re-evaluation concluded that this was an investment that couldn't be deferred due to the need for incremental growth and the high utilization of our existing data centers.  In addition, based on a average 10:1 consolidation, the refresh of single core servers would generate significant operating savings and clear more headroom than seen historically.  The details of this analysis are included in the White Paper:  Staying Committed to Server Refresh Reduces Cost

Questions for the readers: Do others have a refresh strategy or guideline? Are others seeing this type of impact/results and the challenges in implementation?

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I was recently trading thoughts with Anton Chuvakin, a respected security metrics professional, in a philosophical discussion of perfection and quality of security.  Admittedly, I was on auto-pilot (operating without the benefit of coffee) rattling away with my ‘Optimal Security’ rhetoric, when Anton posed two thought provoking questions: CAN one "mandate optimal security"?  How do you "mandate flexible"?

 

I was stopped in my tracks.  This got me thinking.  After fetching a tall cup of coffee to start my brain juices flowing in earnest, I reached back into the pages of history to come up with the following perspective and examples:

 

I believe, to a certain extent, we can mandate flexibility and optimization.  Surely we can act in ways which deny both.  So why can’t we act in a manner which intrinsically promotes them?

 

I think back to lessons of WWII and the Maginot line.  The French chose to create a fortification which was static by design and lacked mobility or a capability to adapt to changing enemy tactics.  They invested heavily into this control, which became the backbone of their country's eastern defense.  It was an appalling failure.  Alternatively, the German blitzkrieg, and the stratagems of both Rommel and Patton prevailed.  Flexibility through mobility was far more effective than an elaborate static defense.

 

I would argue that flexibility can be mandated through proper planning and design.  We have examples in the history of information security.  In the early years of Anti-Virus (AV) products, they were non-memory resident applications which were prescribed to be run once a week.  Updates were a rarity if at all.  That rigid design quickly lost effectiveness, with the rise in velocity of new malware.  AV vendors were forced to adapt.  The overall design has changed to one which is flexible, can be updated to meet emerging malware, and continuously runs in the background to provide persistent security.

 

Rigid security postures lack the ability to remain effective over time and are likely derived by an equally rigid infrastructure which will struggle to adapt to new threats and changes within the organization.  Create security to be flexible and you enable the service to keep up with the continual changes.

 

In general, design a system to be flexible and its longevity for effectiveness is extended.  Plan how systems can continuously adjust itself to align to what is 'optimal' and you increase the sustaining efficiency.

 

We must be strategic in our planning and design of security, lest we suffer the fate of France's Maginot line.

 


Check out Anton’s Blog for other thought provoking viewpoints; just be sure to have your coffee at the ready.

More on “Optimal security”:

Strategy for Sustaining Optimal Security

Information Security Defense In Depth Whitepaper is Now Available

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Defense In Depth Strategy Optimizes Security

The Four Dirty Questions of Measuring Information Security


What are your thoughts?  Rigid or Fluid?  Have you implemented optimal and flexible?

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Think strategic.  Act competitive.  Be secure.

 

Everyone wants information security to be easy.  Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie?  Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

 

The key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security.  It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

 


Fortune Cookie advice for June, 2009:

 

 

Strategy.gif

Think strategic.  Act competitive.  Be secure.

 

Security is a sustaining commitment where long term planning provides a distinct advantage.  Threats are derived from intelligent adversaries.  Success requires maneuvering in a competitive manner to remain secure.

 

 

 

 

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - September 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - November 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - December 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - January 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - February 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - March 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - April 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2009

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Optimal security must not only be attained, but also sustained over time.  A good security strategy must be forward thinking to understand how intervention and continual maintenance will be needed, then implement those capabilities as part of a complete service deployment.

 

Balance.gif

'Optimal Security' is the right balance of security spending and losses prevented where business acceptable losses are achieved.  It changes often and likely maintains different targets for the dissimilar parts of the entity.

 

Organizations are likely to mandate security expectations which typically manifests in a set of configurations, specifications, and operating standards.  The risk is these security controls may be relatively static and entrenched.

 

Establishing a baseline security is a good practice, but in order to remain effective it must adapt to changes in the environment by remaining dynamic to keep in lock-step with rapidly changing threats, vulnerabilities, and resulting exposures.  It must be a fluid posture, able to rapidly change based upon different internal priorities and external changes.  Sustaining business structure must be designed to continually predict areas needing modification and support design and deployment of those changes.  Rigid security postures lack the ability to remain effective over time and are likely derived by an equally rigid infrastructure which will struggle to adapt to new threats and changes within the organization.  Design security to be flexible and you enable the service to keep up with the continual changes in the information branch of security.

 

I recently spoke with an organization who had established a security posture which relied heavily on a hardened OS and application build for their systems.  At the time, they deployed a platform which took into consideration all the best configurations for hardening.  They were so confident they had satisfied security requirements they considered the problem solved.  They integrated the security design into their normal platform refresh cycle of system replacement every few years.  They never comprehended the fact they would need to continually update the build to compensate for changes in threats, new vulnerabilities and malware, and evolving business usage models.

 

The platform’s security, which initially was strong, began to quickly erode.  With no internal mechanism to identify when changes needed to be made, nor the testing and distribution capability, they soon found themselves in a situation where they were responding to individual incidents and changing systems one at a time based upon particular end-user needs.  This created inconsistencies in the builds which was more difficult to support.  Without proper forethought, the security team turned themselves into a firefighting organization, losing the initiative in the war of security.

 

This is one simple technical example.  The same holds true for the expanse of automated solutions and behavioral security controls as well.  Highly effective and efficient security strategies are forward thinking and understand how intervention and continual maintenance will be needed, then implement those capabilities as part of a complete service deployment.  Overall, the concept of ‘optimal security’ is one of fluid adaptations of controls to meet an ever changing target for risk acceptance.

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Back in April I told you about a small proof of concept we were planning to measure energy use in the office environment and then use that established baseline to test different energy saving methods.  I thought it would be good to give you a quick status update on the work done to date.

 

The PoC is currently underway, and in fact, is nearing completion.  Like I mentioned in April, it is pretty small with just 12 users, but we hope the results will help direct what we might later try on a larger scale.

 

We started the PoC on Friday May 15th with meter loggers installed on 6 circuits monitoring energy use for the 12 users in the PoC every 3 minutes.  We ran the metering for 2 weeks before telling the PoC users to establish an uninfluenced baseline.

 

After setting the baseline, we split the 12 users in to 3 groups, each focusing on a different energy savings technique.

 

One group receives information on their energy use every 2 days showing how much energy they are using, what it is costing, and a few simple tips on how they might reduce their energy use.  Nothing is forced.  In this group, we are looking at how “Awareness” alone might change behavior.

 

The second group installed a 3rd party agent on their systems which allows us to enforce more restrictive energy management profiles than they might normally use.  The software also allows us to record time in state on each system, thereby providing a degree of “soft” individual system metering.

 

The last group had USB triggered power strips installed in their offices, connected to their docking stations, which automatically power off all devices in their offices that do not need to be on when they are not there.  We connected devices such as; task lighting, displays, and chargers to these strips.

 

We are in the last week of data collecting now, so stay tuned for some high-level results to be posted soon and possibility a full paper published later.

 

Please let me know if you have any questions or if you are doing or have done anything similar in your enterprise.

 

-Mike

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As a major global manufacturer Intel works constantly to improve its Supply Chain. Our ERP implementation and key projects are integral ingredients in the process of driving Supply Chain improvements. It was exciting that recently we saw Intel recognized as one of the top leading companies from a Supply Chain perspective. AMR Research published The AMR Research Supply Chain Top 25 for 2009.

 

Check out AMR’s Press release:

http://www.amrresearch.com/Content/View.aspx?compURI=tcm%3a7-43474&title=AMR+Research+Releases+Its+2009+Supply+Chain+Top+25

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Intel uses the concept of corporate goals as a way to crystallize what is important across the company.  Every year the CEO and his staff agree on the big items Intel wants to achieve.  These are defined and grading is agreed on.  This is a great recognition tool in that it focuses all needed areas of the company to achieve these goals.

 

From an ERP perspective corporate goals have several advantages.  When running an ERP effort that is one of the corporate goals then it tends to be a lot easier to get support from matrix groups since all groups want to achieve and support the corporate goal.  Generally, groups tend to focus on their own goals (since not all groups have a corporate goal for their activities) but the corporate goals break down cross group barriers and trump group goals.  In years past, ERP in overall or individual programs were not part of the corporate goals.  When this was the case, ERP efforts could be categorized as being IT or business focused.  Items such as ERP upgrades, hardware upgrades, etc. tend to be IT focused.  On the other hand business efforts tend to focus on delivering new functionality (e.g. implement a new Advanced Planning module) that will enable some new element in the business (e.g. a new division or warehouse or improve delivery performance).  When an IT ERP program supports a business corporate goal, then that tends to be a powerful catalyst in terms of ensuring executive and senior management support, resources, and support from other groups.  But the ideal ERP program has both an IT corporate goal and a business corporate goal.  When these rare conditions exist then obstacles are removed as if by magic.  Here the business is extremely motivated as are all the groups needed in IT.  The downside is the amount of visibility and scrutiny tends to be extremely high.  But all in all the positives outweigh the negatives in this “Ideal” ERP scenario. 

 

Whether a corporate goal or not, I would argue that an essential ingredient in ensuring an ERP effort is successful is to ensure both the business and IT think it is a priority.  This may seem obvious but it is not uncommon for an IT department to pursue a major effort that is not necessarily aligned with business priorities.  When this happens, the risk of failure increases dramatically.  At Intel, IT can get a major program included as a corporate goal and this in turn ensures senior business management support.  Although very powerful by itself the effort becomes even more powerful when the same ERP effort is also a business corporate goal.  We have examples of this alignment and it creates a positive environment for ensuring visibility and results.

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Everyone wants information security to be easy.  Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie?  Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

 

Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security.  It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

 

Fortune Cookie advice for May:

 

Fear and anxiety will lead to poor risk analysis conclusions

 

Stay focused on the available facts, use a dose of reality to fill in the gaps, and trust reliable risk models to generate analytical conclusions.

 

Excerpt from the Traps of Measuring Security Blog: In our world of information security, we must take a step back from the limitations and biases we possess and stay true to proper forms of analysis in order to see the truth.  It is far too easy for us to slip backwards and inaccurately measure risk of situations we don’t understand.  Let’s continue to remind each other of this fact and challenge risk assessments, especially in situations where concern is more prevalent than fact.

 

So am I contributing to the problem of over simplifying security? Or am I reaching out to those who might not take an inordinate amount of time necessary to understand the complexities and nuances of our industry? You decide and feel free to share your knowledge-nuggets.

 

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - April 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - September 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - November 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

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The challenges for IT when handling an M&A project can be quite daunting to say the least.  But before we go down those winding, twisting roads, I'll start with an overview of the different types of projects we tend to come across related to M&A deals.

M&A refers to mergers and acquisitions.  These are the deals that companies enter into for various business reasons including growing talent quickly, expanding product lines or entering new markets.  For the IT project manager, these types of deals and decisions result in one of several scenarios.

I have yet to be involved in a merger project.  In my mind, a merger is the joining of at least two companies to form a new combined corporate entity.  The original companies would typically be comparable in size and enter into the deal more as partners on somewhat equal footing in terms of control and influence.  Needless to say, the IT challenges of a merger could be enormous.  Again, I haven't had the experience of working on such a project, so I'll certainly spend more time on the other scenarios.

Acquisitions involve, well, the acquisition of a smaller company by a larger company.  Dare I say it, assimilation?  From an IT perspective, this typically involves figuring out how to bring a smaller company's infrastructure and data into the greater corporate IT environment.  I might add that a key challenge of acquisitions is executing this transition without damaging things like culture, process and work efficiency of the acquired company.

Divestitures are the unnamed scenarios of M&A.  Sometimes we talk about M&A&D, which  makes a nice TLA.  :)  A divestiture typically involves the sale of components of one company to another company.  This is different than an acquisition in that only a piece of a company is being acquired by another.  Although one company's divestiture is in fact another company's acquisition.  Interesting, no?

Finally, I must include another scenario which seems to be quite common these days, the site closure.  Although not exactly an M&A style effort, the site closure is often the ultimate end of an acquisition.  Although I am far from an experienced operator when it comes to M&A, I've been around the block enough to see the pattern...big company acquires smaller company...big company extracts value out of acquisition, or not...a few years pass...acquisition site closes.  Of course, I have also seen acquisition sites become key facilities for ongoing operations.  One interesting twist with site closures is that they can sometimes turn into divestitures.  More on that later.

In a nutshell, these are the four major categories of projects we consider within the IT M&A scope.  I will elaborate more on each scenario in future blog posts.  Stay tuned!

I'm curious to know what kinds of M&A projects have impacted IT at your company?

Disclaimer In Plain English:  My efforts are focused on IT systems integration (or the reverse) and I have no involvement with M&A business negotiations or decisions.  I have no knowledge of and cannot comment on or answer questions regarding specific deals, either announced or unannounced.

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We naturally take comfort in being able to quantify the vagueness of challenges in our existence.  This past week, I was again reminded the cup of information security is filled partially with the complexities of human perception and ambiguity of emotions weighing our mental models of judgment.  These can be misleading.

 

This is not a revelation.  I thrive in the trenches of security measures and metrics, and learned this lesson many seasons past.  But it is so easy to fall back into the comfort of measuring, calculating, estimating, and even predicting risks with first impressions, and foregoing proper data collection and dispassionate analysis.

 

It is in our very nature to apply our big cognitive brains in an attempt to make sense of something which causes concern for our minds when we encounter situations we fail to grapple.  We default to familiar structures of logic and experience to give some insight, even if it is invalid.  If we cannot grasp a cloud, it makes us feel better to at least measure it.

 

I recently travelled to the beautiful city of Shanghai.  In the sprawling city of 19 million, getting about requires the use of a local taxi.  Drivers are aggressive by American standards.  They creatively use all lanes, including those of oncoming traffic, to weave in and out between pedestrians, other vehicles, and bicycles, all at high speed.  Roadway guides such as speed signs, stoplights, and lane markers are just cosmetic.  The concept of ‘right of way’ is defined by the vehicle which gets there first.  Tens of thousands of taxi drivers vie for pole positions at every light and traffic snarl.  I counted no less than half a dozen head-on near misses the first day.

 

Not surprisingly I was a bit concerned for my safety.  But what was the actual risk?  It seemed high, with all the jockeying, speed challenges, and lurching in front of other cars at a moment’s notice.  In formal terms, the security risk calculation was off the map.  Keeping it simple, risk can be defined as equaling the (threat) x (consequence) x (vulnerability).  Threats were abundant and vectoring from every angle.  Vulnerabilities were painfully obvious as the situation was an example of near uncontrolled chaos heavily dependent upon human judgment and intervention.  Lastly, the consequences registered as likely life threatening.  Vehicle safety measures are not equal to US standards, with no airbags and rarely a functioning seatbelt.  My brain began to do the rough math and formed a mental model where the conclusion was somewhere near the “I’m screwed” end of the spectrum.

 

Over time, I started to take a different perspective.  By the end of the week, and too many close calls to count, I observed the city’s taxi’s did not show damage which would be consistent with rampant numbers of collisions.  Although chaotic and unpredictable, they found a balance in avoiding impacts.  My drivers’ never appeared nervous.  Many were happy to take calls on their cell phones while racing into oncoming traffic and weaving back into our directional flow at the last second.  Yet, they were not worried.  The pedestrians who seemed intent on walking into direct paths of vehicles always looked up at the last possible moment and jumped out of the way of an untimely demise.

 

The dangers were still there.  Nothing changed but my perception.  The risks were high, controls were low, but it was the incident rate that was the telling measure.  Lack of vehicle accidents in such a tremendous population meant they operated in an efficient manner which my brain could not comprehend as safe.  But it was.  My initial evaluation misled me to a wrong conclusion: an inaccurate determination of risk.  I felt safer than before.  To this day, I cannot comprehend how they do it.

 

In our world of information security, we must take a step back from the limitations and biases we possess and stay true to proper forms of analysis in order to see the truth.  It is far too easy for us to slip backwards and inaccurately measure risk of situations we don’t understand.  Let’s continue to remind each other of this fact and challenge risk assessments, especially in situations where concern is more prevalent than fact.

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Everyone wants information security to be easy.  Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie?  Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

 

Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security.  It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

 

Fortune Cookie advice for April:

 

Capability, intent, and focus are the defining aspects to quickly prioritize threats.


The world of information security threats is vast.  We can easily be overwhelmed with different components, processes, impacts, and concerns.  Quickly identifying the benign from the urgent is a competitive advantage.  In order to organize and prioritize, we must have a consistent method to judge criteria.

 

I submit the three most compelling aspects are related to the attacker who is committing the violation.  Their capability to do harm, defines the likelihood of a successful attack.  The intent of the attacker has significant implications for the likelihood to detect activity and the persistence of continuing attempts.  Lastly, the focus of the attack, whether it is targeting you specifically or just looking for opportunistic victims, completes the overlapping picture to understand the precision of activities.

 

Given these three aspects, a quick evaluation can be made to determine the severity of the threat and attacks.  Of course this is just the first step necessary for triage, while a full evaluation should be conducted for the areas which rise to the top of the severity list.

 

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - September 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - November 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - December 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - January 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - February 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - March 2009

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