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21 Posts tagged with the threat tag
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No.  Just the people who use them.


Passwords of reasonable strength (8 characters or more consisting of upper/lower case and special keys) coupled with timely expiration, are secure.  Passphrases with comparable measures are equally secure.  The systems and users are currently the weakest links in the security chain.  Security Chain.jpg


The interfaces and tools which we input the passwords may be vulnerable.  This includes but is not limited to key-loggers, sniffers, input redirections, etc.  But it is the user, where the most significant weakness exists.  They can be duped into divulging their passwords (phone, web, chat, email, etc.) and in many cases make them available in other ways (sticky note under the keyboard).


A recent Newsweek article covered the topic of building a better password:

"...a short but hard-to-remember string like "J4fS<2" can be broken by what is called a brute-force attack (in which a computer attempts "a," then "ab," then "abc," and so on) in 219 years, while a long but easy-to-remember phrase like "du-bi-du-bi-dub" will stand for 531,855,448,467 years. (Two hundred nineteen years is actually very good, but the lesson remains: simpler can be stronger.) The idea of passphrases isn't new. But no one has ever told you about it, because over the years, complexity-mandating a mix of letters, numbers, and punctuation that AT&T researcher William Cheswick derides as "eye-of-newt, witches'-brew password fascism"-somehow became the sole determinant of password strength."


The difference between passwords which can be cracked in two-hundred versus a billion years is immaterial if users are forced to change passwords every few months.   The bad guys just don’t have the time to crack the password before it is changed or the data is sufficiently aged to not be of value. 

To undermine cracking attempts, we force users to use 'strong' passwords so that dictionary attacks are fruitless and threat agents must resort to a laborious brute force attack, trying massive numbers of combinations in order to be successful.  All passwords can be cracked via brute force, but it takes time.   It becomes an exercise in how many attempts can be made over a given period.  The faster the process the more combinations can be tried and therefore the shorter the time to discover the one which works.  The length and possible characters determines the number of combinations.

Undermining the strength of a password is not the biggest concern.  It is far more likely for a password to be sniffed on the network, captured on a system, or duped from a user, rather than be cracked.

The most significant vulnerability is with the user and systems where passwords are entered and stored.  There is no practical benefit to further abuse users with new diabolical password schemes.  We should pay less attention to stronger and better password formats and instead invest in better behavioral controls, user education, and the strengthening of system and interfaces.

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Measures generate data and metrics organize data to generate information.  The difference between ‘data’ and ‘information’, the former is something you know, the latter is something you use.

 

Everyone wants information security to be easy.  Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie?  Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

 

The key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security.  It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

 

Fortune Cookie advice for September, 2009:

 

Data and Metrics.jpg

 

Measures generate data and metrics organize data to generate information. 

The difference between ‘data’ and ‘information’, the former is something you know,

the latter is something you use.

 

In security, it is easy to confuse the terms ‘measures’ and ‘metrics’.  They are two distinct but related concepts.  Measurement theory incorporates the scale of nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio, and absolute.  These scales are used to measure something, with the output being data.  Metrics however are about analysis and intelligent decision making.  Metrics translate data into meaningful information which will support decision making.  Data is something you know.  Information is something you use to make decisions.

 

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - No Royal Road to Security - July 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - Strategic Compettive Secure - June 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - September 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - November 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - December 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - January 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - February 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - March 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - April 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2009

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Thinking creatively, a South African IT company decided to use a low technology solution to complete a data transfer when their ISP network could not handle the job.  Typically, quick out-of-the-box IT solutions are rarely secure.  Smart technologists are good at finding solutions to meet their objectives, but when time is short, security tends to be ignored.  Does the combination of frustrated people, short timelines and the need to transfer a lot of data equate to insecurity?  Not always.  Pigeon Data Carrier.jpg

 

Being different sometimes has its security advantages.  In this case data was transferred in a manner which was unpredictable to intercept, highly reliable, impossible to sniff, faster than the traditional available wired network, and maintained high security for integrity and confidentiality.

 

Yes, they used a carrier pigeon.

 

The best news story of the day.

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Employees need the ability to communicate securely.  Deploying the right capabilities can empower employees to keep the organization’s information more secure.  Matthew Rosenquist discusses a strategy to establish secure communication channels.

 

 

Video 2:35 minutes

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Phishing is pervasive, evolving, and a serious threat to everyone.  Matthew Rosenquist discusses strategies to defeat phishing attacks.

 

 

Video 5:14 minutes

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There is no Royal Road to understanding and achieving information security

 

Everyone wants information security to be easy.  Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie?  Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

 

The key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security.  It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.


Fortune Cookie advice for July, 2009:

 

Road1.jpg

There is no Royal Road to understanding and achieving information security

 

Taking a line of thought from Euclid, there is no easy route to understand the ever changing complexities of information security.

We exist in an era where information security is both exciting and complex. 

 

The rapid evolution of information technology, increasing number of targets, and the explosive development of creative tools attackers employ all contribute to a dynamic environment where a continual struggle between aggressors and defenders shifts the balance on a daily basis.  Only through hard work can security professionals effectively pursue achieving an optimal level of security which manages the tradeoffs of cost against controlling impacts and effectiveness of attacks.  Achieving information security is an exercise in hard work, diligence, consistency, and flexibility to adapt technology and behaviors in meeting the challenge.

       

 

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - Strategic Compettive Secure - June 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

 

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - September 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - November 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - December 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - January 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - February 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - March 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - April 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2009

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Greed drives behaviors of cyber attackers.  Matthew Rosenquist discusses the pain and benefits of the Greed Principle.

 

 

 

 

Video 3:29 minutes

 

Purpose of Security Programs

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Telescope.jpgRisk metrics are the heart and soul of information security indicators.  An increasing proliferation of tools and assessments has emerged, attempting to quantify states of information security.  Given the nature of what is trying to be measured, this is arguably one of the toughest challenges in the metrics space.  The recent trend is for different bodies to develop and publish their own standards, which creates confusion regarding accuracy and applicability.  Why all the turmoil, competing models, and misalignment?  The sad story is (queue the somber violins) we just have not figured out how to measure information security risks very well.

 

I have seen and applied many different methods, audits, and evaluations with varying degrees of success and disappointment.  I have come to the following three basic conclusions:

  1. Current tools and methods lack maturity in this area, for both accuracy and comprehensiveness (and yes, I am guilty of contributing to the pool)
  2. No silver bullet exists.  A unified method, which provides a predictive overarching and detailed risk analysis, is unlikely.  Different approaches have their applicability.  Choose wisely 
  3. There is no replacement for a security professional’s brain.  From the selection of the analysis method, the gathering of relevant data, to the interpretation of the results, requires a seasoned security professional.  There is no substitute which can handle the ambiguity, chaos, and relational dependencies affecting the outcome


An example will help express some of the challenges.  The OCTAVE methodology, created by Carnegie Mellon University some years ago has been battle tested veteran in this role.  It is a qualitative to quantitative device which leverages the expertise of key people to give a numerical value of risk in their respective area.  Because personal bias and fears, the need to allow flexible ways of answering questions, and the varying degrees of base knowledge between the experts, results can vary greatly without even factoring in the changes occurring in the threat landscape.

 

Let me be clear, I am a fan and a longtime supporter.  However, it has its limitations.  I have developed several assessments based upon the model in a large environment.  As long as the limitations are accepted, it is applied where it leverages its strengths, and the process is rolled out properly, the results can be very valuable.

 

But don’t confuse value with precision.  I have observed the accuracy to be +/- 40% in complex organizations.  I believe this is largely due to multiple tiers of qualitative-to-quantitative analysis and the bias introduced at each level.  Credible sources have expressed a better +/- 20% accuracy for smaller implementations.  Although these numbers sound terrible, it is very good compared to other methods.  I have great respect for the chaps at Carnegie Mellon University who created the methodology.  Groups within our company have used a modified form of this approach, with advanced structures tailored to our computing ecosystem, for years with great success.  The low accuracy rate is not a poor reflection on the CMU model, rather it is a stark insight on how immature we are in this field.

 

So this is a sad story, but one which is not over.  A cadre of very bright people is working to tackle this problem.  In the short term, I expect to see many more methods, theories, templates, and standards emerge for specific situations.  In the end, I doubt if ever we will have a unified way to measure security risks, but I hold high hopes the best will be culled to a small number which can be applied to most situations and deliver reasonable metrics.

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Think strategic.  Act competitive.  Be secure.

 

Everyone wants information security to be easy.  Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie?  Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

 

The key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security.  It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

 


Fortune Cookie advice for June, 2009:

 

 

Strategy.gif

Think strategic.  Act competitive.  Be secure.

 

Security is a sustaining commitment where long term planning provides a distinct advantage.  Threats are derived from intelligent adversaries.  Success requires maneuvering in a competitive manner to remain secure.

 

 

 

 

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - September 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - December 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - January 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - February 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - March 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - April 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2009

0 Comments Permalink
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Everyone wants information security to be easy.  Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie?  Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

 

Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security.  It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

 

Fortune Cookie advice for May:

 

Fear and anxiety will lead to poor risk analysis conclusions

 

Stay focused on the available facts, use a dose of reality to fill in the gaps, and trust reliable risk models to generate analytical conclusions.

 

Excerpt from the Traps of Measuring Security Blog: In our world of information security, we must take a step back from the limitations and biases we possess and stay true to proper forms of analysis in order to see the truth.  It is far too easy for us to slip backwards and inaccurately measure risk of situations we don’t understand.  Let’s continue to remind each other of this fact and challenge risk assessments, especially in situations where concern is more prevalent than fact.

 

So am I contributing to the problem of over simplifying security? Or am I reaching out to those who might not take an inordinate amount of time necessary to understand the complexities and nuances of our industry? You decide and feel free to share your knowledge-nuggets.

 

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - April 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - September 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - November 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

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We naturally take comfort in being able to quantify the vagueness of challenges in our existence.  This past week, I was again reminded the cup of information security is filled partially with the complexities of human perception and ambiguity of emotions weighing our mental models of judgment.  These can be misleading.

 

This is not a revelation.  I thrive in the trenches of security measures and metrics, and learned this lesson many seasons past.  But it is so easy to fall back into the comfort of measuring, calculating, estimating, and even predicting risks with first impressions, and foregoing proper data collection and dispassionate analysis.

 

It is in our very nature to apply our big cognitive brains in an attempt to make sense of something which causes concern for our minds when we encounter situations we fail to grapple.  We default to familiar structures of logic and experience to give some insight, even if it is invalid.  If we cannot grasp a cloud, it makes us feel better to at least measure it.

 

I recently travelled to the beautiful city of Shanghai.  In the sprawling city of 19 million, getting about requires the use of a local taxi.  Drivers are aggressive by American standards.  They creatively use all lanes, including those of oncoming traffic, to weave in and out between pedestrians, other vehicles, and bicycles, all at high speed.  Roadway guides such as speed signs, stoplights, and lane markers are just cosmetic.  The concept of ‘right of way’ is defined by the vehicle which gets there first.  Tens of thousands of taxi drivers vie for pole positions at every light and traffic snarl.  I counted no less than half a dozen head-on near misses the first day.

 

Not surprisingly I was a bit concerned for my safety.  But what was the actual risk?  It seemed high, with all the jockeying, speed challenges, and lurching in front of other cars at a moment’s notice.  In formal terms, the security risk calculation was off the map.  Keeping it simple, risk can be defined as equaling the (threat) x (consequence) x (vulnerability).  Threats were abundant and vectoring from every angle.  Vulnerabilities were painfully obvious as the situation was an example of near uncontrolled chaos heavily dependent upon human judgment and intervention.  Lastly, the consequences registered as likely life threatening.  Vehicle safety measures are not equal to US standards, with no airbags and rarely a functioning seatbelt.  My brain began to do the rough math and formed a mental model where the conclusion was somewhere near the “I’m screwed” end of the spectrum.

 

Over time, I started to take a different perspective.  By the end of the week, and too many close calls to count, I observed the city’s taxi’s did not show damage which would be consistent with rampant numbers of collisions.  Although chaotic and unpredictable, they found a balance in avoiding impacts.  My drivers’ never appeared nervous.  Many were happy to take calls on their cell phones while racing into oncoming traffic and weaving back into our directional flow at the last second.  Yet, they were not worried.  The pedestrians who seemed intent on walking into direct paths of vehicles always looked up at the last possible moment and jumped out of the way of an untimely demise.

 

The dangers were still there.  Nothing changed but my perception.  The risks were high, controls were low, but it was the incident rate that was the telling measure.  Lack of vehicle accidents in such a tremendous population meant they operated in an efficient manner which my brain could not comprehend as safe.  But it was.  My initial evaluation misled me to a wrong conclusion: an inaccurate determination of risk.  I felt safer than before.  To this day, I cannot comprehend how they do it.

 

In our world of information security, we must take a step back from the limitations and biases we possess and stay true to proper forms of analysis in order to see the truth.  It is far too easy for us to slip backwards and inaccurately measure risk of situations we don’t understand.  Let’s continue to remind each other of this fact and challenge risk assessments, especially in situations where concern is more prevalent than fact.

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Everyone wants information security to be easy.  Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie?  Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

 

Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security.  It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

 

Fortune Cookie advice for April:

 

Capability, intent, and focus are the defining aspects to quickly prioritize threats.


The world of information security threats is vast.  We can easily be overwhelmed with different components, processes, impacts, and concerns.  Quickly identifying the benign from the urgent is a competitive advantage.  In order to organize and prioritize, we must have a consistent method to judge criteria.

 

I submit the three most compelling aspects are related to the attacker who is committing the violation.  Their capability to do harm, defines the likelihood of a successful attack.  The intent of the attacker has significant implications for the likelihood to detect activity and the persistence of continuing attempts.  Lastly, the focus of the attack, whether it is targeting you specifically or just looking for opportunistic victims, completes the overlapping picture to understand the precision of activities.

 

Given these three aspects, a quick evaluation can be made to determine the severity of the threat and attacks.  Of course this is just the first step necessary for triage, while a full evaluation should be conducted for the areas which rise to the top of the severity list.

 

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - September 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - November 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - December 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - January 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - February 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - March 2009

0 Comments Permalink
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Everyone wants information security to be easy.  Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie?  Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

 

Common Sense
I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security.  It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

 

Fortune Cookie advice for March:

 

The most successful civilizations rose to power, not by ignoring security, rather they ensured greatness through strategy and achievement.

 

Rosenquist Sig pic2.gif

 

For this month’s advice, you are a victim of eye-candy.  I created this slide for a recent presentation, to capture the audience’s attention and rouse some brain juices flowing.

 

The general message does hold true.  Security strategy is the long term endeavor to protect an organization’s future.  If the war is fought thinking exclusively about one battle at a time, you will lose the tide of initiative and ultimately spend most of resources responding to your opponent’s attacks.  If however, we keep in mind the end goals and manage to a state of optimal security, we can progress towards an advantageous and sustainable level of security.

 

We don’t have to win every fight, lock every door, and close every exposure.  Instead, we are in a position to selectively choose our victories to maximize our capabilities.  Our victory is finding the right balance of risk and costs.  Thinking strategically, in concert with tactical actions, will drive clarity for the desired end-state of security.

 

In practical terms:

  • Have a plan and communicate it
  • Understand the business need for security
  • Prioritize security initiatives based upon their value
  • Develop an overall defense-in-depth capability, with interlocking services
  • Characterize the most severe threats and identify the most likely and impactful exposures
  • Know what you are protecting
  • Be cognizant of when you need more, have enough, or too much security

 

My moment of enlightenment is over.  It is time to get back to the grind of the security firefights.  But my strategy is never far from my mind.  It defines the boundaries and guides my tactical decisions.

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Everyone wants information security to be easy.  Wouldn’t it be nice if it were simple enough to fit snugly inside a fortune cookie?  Well, although I don’t try to promote such foolish nonsense, I do on occasion pass on readily digestible nuggets to reinforce security principles and get people thinking how security applies to their environment.

 

Common Sense

I think the key to fortune cookie advice is ‘common sense’ in the context of security.  It must be simple, succinct, and make sense to everyone, while conveying important security aspects.

 

Fortune Cookie advice for February:

 

A worthless metric is one which fails to drive decisions, even when the metric result radically changes.

 

The world of information security is full of metrics.  Sadly, many are worthless.  A valuable metric is one which drives decisions.  Unfortunately, our industry also persists in publishing metrics which may nicely fill graphs and catch attention with flash, but in the end are meaningless.  The true test: can it facilitate change.

 

One of my favorite metrics to pick on is a graphic which shows the percentage of internet attacks by country.  Provided every year, this metric presentation is visually stunning, usually consisting of a background of the globe with offending countries in vibrant colors.  It is clear, attention grabbing, and even interesting in a sublime way.  Media outlets love the eye candy.  But at the end of the day, the data is meaningless.  It does not really matter where attacks initiate from.  Organizations will not change their course of security if the numbers shifted drastically over time.  The proximity and country of origin simply does not matter.  The number and types of attacks are far more relevant, but not the division of origin based upon international borders.

 

Whenever we are presented with metrics, we must think critically to understand their value.  Don’t get caught up in beautiful graphics or catchy titles.  Challenge everything.  Would you do something differently in your approach to securing your environment if the data changed radically?  If not, then move along, nothing here to see.

 

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - January 2009

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - December 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - November 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - September 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - August 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - June 2008

Fortune Cookie Security Advice - May 2008

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The security industry has spent an inordinate amount of effort focusing on defense against vulnerabilities.  But there are other opportunities.

 

Listen to the Audiocast: Targeting the Attacker(4:54 minutes)

 

The concept of targeting attackers has merit.  It is another path to undermine attacks and may make sense as part of a comprehensive security package.  It is time our industry recognizes the potential and put thought into developing such security programs.

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